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Introduction
Experiments on the internet have become more and more frequent in recent years. 1 Using the internet has some obvious advantages. It is a relatively inexpensive way of reaching many subjects. It allows to broaden the subjects pool beyond the standard undergraduate student population. In addition, decision making at one's own PC at home or in the o¢ ce is arguably a more natural setting than that in the laboratory. It resembles an environment that is familiar to many people, e.g. from home banking.
However, experimenting on the internet also poses a number of new challenges. In this note we will focus on one such problem, namely the way incentives are provided to subjects. In experimental economics, standard procedures require that subjects receive adequate incentives. Although usually those incentives are provided through cash payments, other incentives are being used (e.g. grades, lottery tickets for non-cash prizes, etc.). For obvious reasons, the distribution of cash is di¢ cult and/or expensive in large-scale internet experiments. Furthermore, often an experimenter wants to collect data anonymously, which can nicely be done via the internet. Yet, to preserve anonymity one does not want pay subjects directly because such payment requires knowing the subject's identity (e.g. name plus postal address or the bank account number). It would thus be desirable if other incentives schemes could be found that would provide adequate incentives but would not distort results.
We consider here one such incentive scheme that is well known from computer games (or for the older of us, from pinball machines), the high score. The high score is simply a list of top performers (i.e. usually their initials or nicknames) with their associated score or payo¤. The idea is that subjects are inherently motivated to achieve a top placement on this list. If this were true, the high score would be a very cost-e¤ective and simple way 1 of providing incentives to subjects in internet experiments.
We test the hypothesis that a high score provides adequate and nondistortionary incentives by comparing subjects'behavior in an internet experiment with behavior of subjects in a laboratory where we provide various forms of incentives. Incentives in the lab range from the usual performance pay over …xed payments to no payment at all. All incentive schemes in the lab are supplemented through a high score.
Our main …ndings are that results obtained with a high score di¤er signi…cantly from those obtained with the usual cash incentives. This holds independently of whether the experiment is run on the internet or in the laboratory.
Experimental design
More than 700 subjects participated in a simple experiment with the structure of a Cournot duopoly. Table 1 provides a summary of the four experimental treatments. 2 The bulk of the experiment was conducted as an internet experiment (setting net). In net, subjects played on the internet, in a location of their own choice (home, o¢ ce etc.), and at their own pace. The only incentives for subject was the chance to be listed on a high score table, which publicly displayed on our webpage the score and the chosen nickname of each player. 3 Additionally, there were three di¤erent laboratory experiments with various forms of monetary incentives, which were designed to bridge the gap between net and a standard laboratory experiment. Closest to net was setting lab-np, in which subjects played in the laboratory but without any monetary incentives. 4 As in net, the only incentive was the high score table. Thus, the only di¤erence between the two treatments was the environment, that is, laboratory versus subjects'homes or o¢ ces. Next in line was setting lab-f, in which additional to the high score table, subjects received a …xed payment of 10 euros as soon as they entered the lab. 5 Finally, setting lab was the usual laboratory experiment in which subjects were paid according to the sum of their pro…ts. A high score table was displayed in addition. The instructions for all settings were the same up to the incentive structure. At the end of the experiment, we asked subjects to …ll in a questionnaire with some demographic data. 6 The game played in the experiment was a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear inverse demand function maxf109 Q; 0g and constant marginal cost of 1. Each player's quantity q i , i = 1; 2 was an element of the discrete set of actions f0; 1; :::; 109; 110g. Player i's pro…t function was given by
Given this payo¤ function, it is straightforward to compute the Nash equilibrium, which is at q 1 = q 2 = 36. Subjects played the Cournot duopoly repeatedly for 40 rounds with the same opponent. Each subject was matched against a computer that was programmed to one of a number of standard learning algorithms. Subjects were told that they play against a computer but they received no further information about the algorithm. Computers were programmed to play according to noisy versions of one of the following decision rules: Best-response, …ctitious play, imitate the best, reinforcement Table 2 summarizes the main variables of interest, namely mean quantities of subjects and the average of their total pro…ts. Note …rst that there are no signi…cant di¤erences for either quantities or pro…ts between net, lab-np, and lab-f at any conventional level of signi…cance of a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test. The average quantities in net, lab-np, and lab-f are almost the same at about 48 whereas in lab average quantity is only 43.14. 8 All pairwise di¤erence between net, lab-np, and lab-f on the one hand and lab on the other hand are signi…cant at the 1% level. For lab, we also …nd higher total pro…ts than in all three other treatments although this di¤erence is not signi…cant (see however the regression results below where we …nd a signi…cant di¤erence). 2001), variances on the net are higher than in lab (F-test, p < 0:05) for both, quantities and pro…ts. However, this also seems to be driven by incentives as variances in lab-np and lab-f are not signi…cantly di¤erent from those in net.
The di¤erences in mean quantities between lab and net can be summa-7 See our companion paper for details about the learning processes (Duersch et al. 2008 ). 8 In a di¤erent context, Shavit et al. (2001) …nd that bids in a lottery evaluation task are signi…cantly higher on the internet than in a classroom experiment. The …rst arrow indicates a signi…cant increase in quantities between lab and lab-f. The next two arrows indicate that there are no signi…cant di¤erences at any conventional level between lab-f, lab-np, and net. We conclude that the di¤erence between lab and net is primarily driven by the lack of monetary incentives in net and probably less so by the environment of the decision maker (internet vs. laboratory). 10 Most importantly, given that even in the laboratory, there are substantial and highly signi…cant di¤erences in average quantities between lab and lab-f, we can reject the hypothesis that a high score provides adequate and non-distortionary incentives for all decision tasks.
For a more detailed look at the data, we ran OLS regressions to explain average quantities of subjects and average total pro…ts (see Table 3 ). Con-…rming the MWU-tests above, Table 3 shows that average quantities in lab are signi…cantly lower than in net (at the 1% level). But now also average pro…ts are signi…cantly higher in net. Again, there is no signi…cant di¤erence for average quantities or pro…ts between net, lab-f, and lab-np. These e¤ects are robust to inclusion of the learning algorithms the subjects were matched against and the starting values of the computer. Interestingly, female subjects tend to choose lower quantities. Finally, it is reassuring that subjects with some training in economics and researchers obtained signi…cantly higher pro…ts.
Conclusion
Our experiment provides some methodological lessons with respect to internet experiments. The option of providing incentives through a high score table seems attractive since it is inexpensive and reduces the organizational burden on the experimenter. However, we show in this experiment that results obtained with a high score di¤er signi…cantly from those obtained with the usual cash incentives. This holds independently of whether the experiment is run on the internet or in the laboratory. For future (internet) experiments, we would thus suggest the use of signi…cant and performance based …nancial incentives. 11
Appendix (not intended for publication)
A Details of the experimental design The sequence of events was as follows. After logging in (after entering the laboratory, respectively), subjects were randomly matched to a computer type.
The computer type was displayed to subjects via a label (Greek letters) though subjects were not told how computer types were associated with labels. In the instructions (see below) subjects were told the following: "The other …rm is always played by a computer program. The computer uses a …xed algorithm to calculate its output which may depend on a number of things but it cannot observe your output from the current round before making its decision."
A page with instructions was displayed to subjects. At any time during the experiment, subjects were able read the instructions and an example for calculating pro…ts by opening a separate window on their computer. After reading the instructions, subjects could input their quantity for the …rst round. The computer displayed a new window with the results for the current round including the number of the round, the subject's quantity, the subject's pro…t, the computer's quantity as well as the computer's pro…t (see Appendix B for screenshots). A subject had to acknowledge this information before moving on to the following round. Upon acknowledgment, a new page appeared with an input …eld for the new quantity.
This page also showed a table with the history of previous round(s)'s quantities and pro…ts for both players.
After round 40, subjects were asked to …ll in a brief questionnaire (see below)
with information on gender, occupation, country of origin, formal training in game theory or economic theory, previous participation in online experiments, and the free format question "Please explain in a few words how you made your decisions".
It was possible to skip this questionnaire.
The high score was displayed on the following page. This table contained a ranking among all previous subjects, separately for subjects who were matched against the same computer type and for all subjects. It also contained the computer's score. its output which may depend on a number of things but it cannot observe your output from the current round before making its decision. Your pro…ts from all 40 rounds will be added up to calculate your total earnings. Please do not use the browser buttons (back, forward) during the game, and do not click twice on the go button, it may take a short while.
B Instructions

B.1 Introduction Page Internet
Choose new quantity
Please choose an integer (whole number) between 0 and 110.
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B.3 Example Page
The Formula
The pro…t in each round is calculated according to the following formula: Pro…t = (Price 1) * Your Output
The price, in turn, is calculated as follows.
Price = 109 Combined Output
That is, if either you or the computer raises the output by 1, the price falls by 1 for both of you. (but note that the price cannot become negative). And the combined output is simply:
Combined Output = Your Output + Computers Output Example:
Lets say your output is 20, and the computers output is 40. Hence, combined output is 60 and the price would be 49 (= 109 -60). Your pro…t would be (49 1)*20 = 960. The computers pro…t would be (49 -1)*40 = 1920. Now assume you raise your output to 30, while the computer stays at 40. The new price would be 39 ( = 109-40-30). Your pro…t would be (39 -1)*30 = 1140. The computers pro…t would be (39 -1)*40 = 1520.
To continue, please close this window.
